

TO BLOG OR NOT TO BLOG

A CRITICAL REVIEW OF BLOGS AS A
TEACHING TOOL

INTRODUCTION

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KANT, GROUNDWORK FOR THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS, CHAPTER 2 (SELECTION)

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1 [page 1] We shall therefore have to investigate a priori the possibility of a categorical imperative, as we have not in this case the advantage of its reality being given in experience, so that [the elucidation of] its possibility should be requisite only for its explanation, not for its establishment. In the meantime it may be discerned beforehand that the categorical imperative alone has the purport of a practical law; all the rest may indeed be called principles of the will but not laws, since whatever is only necessary for the attainment of some arbitrary purpose may be considered as in itself contingent, and we can at any time be free from the precept if we give up the purpose; on the contrary, the unconditional command leaves the will no liberty to choose the opposite; consequently it alone carries with it that necessity which we require in a law.

2 Secondly, in the case of this categorical imperative or law of morality, the difficulty (of discerning its possibility) is a very profound one. It is an a priori synthetical practical proposition; and as there is so much difficulty in discerning the possibility of speculative propositions of this kind, it may readily be supposed that the difficulty will be no less with the practical.

3 * I connect the act with the will without presupposing any condition resulting from any inclination, but a priori, and therefore necessarily

2 general comments

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Student 1

2/3/2012

Immanuel Kant was a German philosopher writing at the end of the 18th century. His main aim was to create a way of establishing absolute moral laws through the categorical imperative. This idea of the categorical imperative is Kant's most influential work, and this passage comes from one of his most excessive works. As a philosopher he has great influence on many modern thinkers such as Jean Piaget and John Rawls.

reply

Student 2

2/5/2012

What Kant seems to be attempting here is to show that rational people are capable of deducing sound morality



23 The question then is this: Is it a necessary law for all rational beings that they should always judge of their actions by maxims of which they can themselves will that they should serve as universal laws? If it is so, then it must be connected (altogether a priori) with the very conception of the will of a rational being generally. But in order to discover this connexion we must, however reluctantly, take a step into metaphysic, although into a domain of it which is distinct from speculative philosophy, namely, the metaphysic of morals. In a practical philosophy, where it is not the reasons of what happens that we have to ascertain, but the laws of what ought to happen, even although it never does, i.e., objective practical laws, there it is not necessary to inquire into the reasons why anything pleases or displeases, how the pleasure of mere sensation differs from taste, and whether the latter is distinct from a general satisfaction of reason; on what the feeling of pleasure or pain rests, and how from it desires and inclinations arise, and from these again maxims by the co-operation of reason: for all this belongs to an empirical psychology, which would constitute the second part of physics, if we regard physics as the philosophy of nature, so far as it is based on empirical laws. But here we are concerned with objective practical laws and, consequently, with the relation of the will to itself so far as it is determined by reason alone, in which case whatever has reference to anything empirical is necessarily excluded; since if reason of itself alone determines the conduct (and it is the possibility of this that we are now investigating), it must necessarily do so a priori.

24 The will is conceived as a faculty of determining oneself to action in accordance with the conception of certain laws. And such a faculty can be found only in rational beings. Now that which serves the will as the objective ground of its self-determination is the end, and, if this is assigned by reason alone, it must hold for all rational beings. On the other hand, that which merely contains the ground of possibility of the action of which the effect is the end, this is called the means. The subjective ground of the desire is the spring, the objective ground of the volition is the motive; hence the distinction between subjective ends which rest on springs, and objective ends which depend on motives valid for every rational being. Practical principles are formal when they abstract from all subjective ends; they are material when they assume these, and therefore particular springs of action. The ends which a rational being proposes to himself at pleasure as effects of his actions (material ends) are all only relative, for it is only their relation to the particular desires of the subject that gives them their worth, which therefore cannot furnish principles universal and necessary for all rational beings and for every volition, that is to say practical laws. Hence all these relative ends can give rise only to

Amelia

2/2/2012

The main question at the start of this paragraph, appears to be a main idea of this moral argument and to Kant the answer seems to be apparent in the question. However to me the answer does not seem to be so simple, because in different circumstances there should and are different answers to the question. At certain times, something which although you may not wish to be made universal, that may be the only right and moral action needed at the time. Due to these cases, I wonder whether in this type of ethical theory, there is any room for emotion and if not then is it possible for any human to make what Kant calls rational moral decisions without their emotion being involved?

[reply](#)
Laura Foley

2/5/2012

In answer to Amelia's question whether there is any room for emotion in Kant's theory especially when making rational ethical decisions, the answer is no, yet according to Kant this is the whole point of rationality. A moral decision should solely be based on reason according to Kant, no emotions should be involved as humans should act out of duty alone, and emotions should never be consulted as this means the decision isn't rational. Duty can and should be guided by good will as this is what helps us choose to make good decisions, yet emotions should not be consulted as emotions make us forget what our duty is.

Katie Spratt

2/6/2012

I agree with Laura in that emotion causes humans to act irrationally and therefore cannot make good ethical or

else that appears charming to the affections, every [page 5] one may readily perceive with the least exertion of his reason, if it be not wholly spoiled for abstraction.

23 The question then is this: Is it a necessary law for all rational beings that they should always judge of their actions by maxims of which they can themselves will that they should serve as universal laws? If it is so, then it must be connected (altogether a priori) with the very conception of the will of a rational being generally. But in order to discover this connexion we must, however reluctantly, take a step into metaphysic, although into a domain of it which is distinct from speculative philosophy, namely, the metaphysic of morals. In a practical philosophy, where it is not the reasons of what happens that we have to ascertain, but the laws of what ought to happen, even although it never does, i.e., objective practical laws, there it is not necessary to inquire into the reasons why anything pleases or displeases, how the pleasure of mere sensation differs from taste, and whether the latter is distinct from a general satisfaction of reason; on what the feeling of pleasure or pain rests, and how from it desires and inclinations arise, and from these again maxims by the co-operation of reason: for all this belongs to an empirical psychology, which would constitute the second part of physics, if we regard physics as the philosophy of nature, so far as it is based on empirical laws. But here we are concerned with objective practical laws and, consequently, with the relation of the will to itself so far as it is determined by reason alone, in which case whatever has reference to anything empirical is necessarily excluded; since if reason of itself alone determines the conduct (and it is the possibility of this that we are now investigating), it must necessarily do so a priori.

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emotion within Kant's ethical theory. Duty must be a 'law for all human wills' and must be defined independent of inclination or feelings. At the heart of Kant's deontology is the idea that certain actions are always right or wrong. If we try to bring any kind of feeling or emotion in, there is no way we can stick to this principle because we would always judge actions according to our own feelings, not some external idea of what is right or wrong. In terms of faith, Kant argues that while faith is not a necessary condition for achieving the good, he still holds the Christian emphasis on the will as the centre of the moral life.

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I agree completely, but could we suggest that Kant is not completely sidelining the role of emotion, but perhaps attempting to re-prioritize them within moral reasoning?

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25 1 comment

26 0 comments

27 0 comments

28 0 comments

29 0 comments

30 0 comments

31 0 comments

David Hume, 'Of benevolence',
Section II of An Enquiry
Concerning The Principles of
Morals

After Virtue, Selection (pp. 1-10)

1 Corinthians 8:1-13

John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism,
Chapter 2

Grisez Reading

Luke 18:18-23

**Kant, Groundwork for the
Metaphysic of Morals, Chapter
2 (selection)**

Yoder, Otherness of the Church

Matthew 20:1-16

Rawls, Justice as Fairness

Jose Miranda, Law and
Civilization

Matthew 5:21-26, 38-48

Augustine, City of God, Book
XIX, Chapters 10-14

Yoder, The Original Revolution

Exodus 20:1-17, The Ten
Commandments

Aquinas, Edited Selection on
"Law and Grace"

O'Donovan, Biblical Ethics

Genesis 1:24-31

Romans 1:19-27

Aquinas, Edited Selection on
"Law and Grace," part 2

Northcott, Ecology and Christian
Ethics

Romans 2:6-16

Joseph Butler, 'Sermon II: On the
Natural Supremacy of Conscience'
from Sermons: Fifteen Sermons
Preached at the Rolls Chapel
(1827)

John Paul II, 'Conscience and
Truth' in Veritatis Splendor (1993)
¶54 - 68.

Galatians 5: 13-26

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and makes: this is a concept that seems to completely
avoid.

[reply](#)

2/6/2012

I would agree with Laura's point, there is no place for
emotion within Kant's ethical theory. Duty must be a 'law
for all human wills' and must be defined independent of
inclination or feelings. At the heart of Kant's deontology is
the idea that certain actions are always right or wrong. If we
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[reply](#)

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OMEKA

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
The Galilee Boat



The Arch of Titus



The Alexamenos
Graffito



Codex
Sinaiticus

Graffiti in the Ancient World



stylus-11162.jpg

Ten bronze stylus of identical form found together in the ruins of what was most likely a Roman period school,



We might think of graffiti as being a modern form of art or expression, but its origins are in the ancient world. Historians have found over six thousand graffiti in Pompeii and they claim that the graffiti explains more about the culture, feelings and circumstances of Pompeians of that time, than any other sources. Likewise, the same evidence is found in Rome where about every single surface of marble or similar material has some sort of graffiti on it. Common for all of them is that the graffiti, whether it something interesting such as letters, symbols, sentences, emblems or profane words and caricatures, all are carved with a knife, nail or similar sharp instrument.

This has led historians and archaeologists to believe that carrying such objects was something very common and that graffiti was a normal way of expressing oneself. The same pattern is found today.

The Alexamenos graffito can be placed under the category of caricature as it is widely interpreted that the inscription or graffiti

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


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Caption

B *I* U | [List Icons] | Paragraph HTML

The Alexamenos Graffito carved in plaster on a wall near the Palatine Hill in Rome.

2

B *I* U | [List Icons] | Paragraph HTML**Discovery**

In 1857, the Alexamenos graffito was unearthed during an excavation of the Domus Gelotiana, a house in the Imperial Palace of Emperor Caligula.

The palace rests on the Palatine, one of the *montes* within the limits of the old city of Rome. The Domus Gelotiana (House of Gelotius) was bought by Emperor Caligula in the third century C.E. and incorporated into the crown property. Still a boy at the time, Caligula was quite fond of horse races and purchased the house because it was the closest building on the Palatine to the circus. The Domus consists of an outer part that remains

LESSONS LEARNED

A close-up photograph of a hand typing on a black computer keyboard. The image is heavily blurred and has a dark blue, semi-transparent overlay, creating a moody and tech-oriented atmosphere. The text is centered over the image.

I. Embed Blogging in Course Design



2. Simplicity and Elegance Matter

3. Communicate the Proper Writing Modes



4. Ensure Accessible Support

A red lifebuoy with a white rope and a silver reflective band, hanging on a dark blue wooden wall. The lifebuoy is partially visible on the right side of the frame, with its rope extending upwards and downwards. The background is a dark blue wooden wall with vertical planks.

A close-up photograph of a weathered, light-colored metal toolbox. The toolbox has a handle on top and a latch on the front. The surface is scratched and shows signs of age. The text "5. Don't Blame the Tool" is overlaid in white.

5. Don't Blame the Tool

Q&A