TO BLOG OR NOT TO BLOG

A CRITICAL REVIEW OF BLOGS AS A TEACHING TOOL
INTRODUCTION
DIGRESS.IT
LEARNING THROUGH SOCIAL ANNOTATION
KANT, GROUNDWORK FOR THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS, CHAPTER 2 (SELECTION)

1. We shall therefore have to investigate a priori the possibility of a categorical imperative, as we have not in this case the advantage of its reality being given in experience, so that [the elucidation of] its possibility should be requisite only for its explanation, not for its establishment. In the meantime it may be discerned beforehand that the categorical imperative alone has the purport of a practical law; all the rest may indeed be called principles of the will but not laws, since whatever is only necessary for the attainment of some arbitrary purpose may be considered as in itself contingent, and we can at any time be free from the precept if we give up the purpose; on the contrary, the unconditional command leaves the will no liberty to choose the opposite; consequently it alone carries with it that necessity which we require in a law.

2. Secondly, in the case of this categorical imperative or law of morality, the difficulty (of discerning its possibility) is a very profound one. It is an a priori synthetical practical proposition; and as there is so much difficulty in discerning the possibility of speculative propositions of this kind, it may readily be supposed that the difficulty will be no less with the practical.

* I connect the act with the will without presupposing any condition resulting from any inclination, but a priori, and therefore necessarily
The question then is this: Is it a necessary law for all rational beings that they should always judge of their actions by maxims of which they can themselves will that they should serve as universal laws? If it is so, then it must be connected (altogether a priori) with the very conception of the will of a rational being generally. But in order to discover this connexion we must, however reluctantly, take a step into metaphysics, although into a domain of it which is distinct from speculative philosophy, namely, the metaphysic of morals. In a practical philosophy, where it is not the reasons of what happens that we have to ascertain, but the laws of what ought to happen, even although it never does, i.e., objective practical laws, there it is not necessary to inquire into the reasons why anything pleases or displeases, how the pleasure of mere sensation differs from taste, and whether the latter is distinct from a general satisfaction of reason; on what the feeling of pleasure or pain rests, and how from it desires and inclinations arise, and from these again maxims by the co-operation of reason: for all this belongs to an empirical psychology, which would constitute the second part of physics, if we regard physics as the philosophy of nature, so far as it is based on empirical laws. But here we are concerned with objective practical laws and, consequently, with the relation of the will to itself so far as it is determined by reason alone, in which case whatever has reference to anything empirical is necessarily excluded; since if reason of itself alone determines the conduct (and it is the possibility of this that we are now investigating), it must necessarily do so a priori.

The will is conceived as a faculty of determining oneself to action in accordance with the conception of certain laws. And such a faculty can be found only in rational beings. Now that which serves the will as the objective ground of its self-determination is the end, and, if this is assigned by reason alone, it must hold for all rational beings. On the other hand, that which merely contains the ground of possibility of the action of which the effect is the end, this is called the means. The subjective ground of the desire is the spring, the objective ground of the volition is the motive; hence the distinction between subjective ends which rest on springs, and objective ends which depend on motives valid for every rational being. Practical principles are formal when they abstract from all subjective ends; they are material when they assume these, and therefore particular springs of action. The ends which a rational being proposes to himself at pleasure as effects of his actions (material ends) are all only relative, for it is only their relation to the particular desires of the subject that gives them their worth, which therefore cannot furnish principles universal and necessary for all rational beings and for every volition, that is to say practical laws. Hence all these relative ends can give rise only to partial systems of practical laws; and as these are all determined by the conceiving faculty, the empirical psychology is the only part of practical philosophy which can be of interest to us.

The main question at the start of this paragraph, appears to be a main idea of this moral argument and to Kant the answer seems to be apparent in the question. However to me the answer does not seem to be so simple, because in different circumstances there should and are different answers to the question. At certain times, something which although you may not wish to be made universal, that may be the only right and moral action needed at the time. Due to these cases, I wonder whether in this type of ethical theory, there is any room for emotion and if not then is it possible for any human to make what Kant calls rational moral decisions without their emotion being involved?

In answer to Amelia’s question whether there is any room for emotion in Kant’s theory especially when making rational ethical decisions, the answer is no, yet according to Kant this is the whole point of rationality. A moral decision should solely be based on reason according to Kant, no emotions should be involved as humans should act out of duty alone, and emotions should never be consulted as this means the decision isn’t rational. Duty can and should be guided by good will as this is what helps us choose to make good decisions, yet emotions should not be consulted as emotions make us forget what our duty is.

I agree with Laura in that emotion causes humans to act irrationally and therefore cannot make good ethical or moral decisions.
else that appears charming to the affections, every [page 5] one may readily perceive with the least exertion of his reason, if it be not wholly spoiled for abstraction.

The question then is this: Is it a necessary law for all rational beings that they should always judge of their actions by maxims of which they can themselves will that they should serve as universal laws? If it is so, then it must be connected (altogether a priori) with the very conception of the will of a rational being generally. But in order to discover this connexion we must, however reluctantly, take a step into metaphysic, although into a domain of it which is distinct from speculative philosophy, namely, the metaphysic of morals. In a practical philosophy, where it is not the reasons of what happens that we have to ascertain, but the laws of what ought to happen, even although it never does, i.e., objective practical laws, there it is not necessary to inquire into the reasons why anything pleases or displeases, how the pleasure of mere sensation differs from taste, and whether the latter is distinct from a general satisfaction of reason; on what the feeling of pleasure or pain rests, and how from it desires and inclinations arise, and from these again maxims by the co-operation of reason: for all this belongs to an empirical psychology, which would constitute the second part of physics, if we regard physics as the philosophy of nature, so far as it is based on empirical laws. But here we are concerned with objective practical laws and, consequently, with the relation of the will to itself so far as it is determined by reason alone, in which case whatever has reference to anything empirical is necessarily excluded; since if reason of itself alone determines the conduct (and it is the possibility of this that we are now investigating), it must necessarily do so a priori.

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Kant, Groundwork for the Metaphysic of Morals, Chapter 2 (selection)

Yoder, Otherness of the Church
Matthew 20:1-16
Rawls, Justice as Fairness
Jose Miranda, Law and Civilization
Matthew 5:21-26, 38-48
Augustine, City of God, Book XIX, Chapters 10-14
Yoder, The Original Revolution
Exodus 20:1-17, The Ten Commandments
Aquinas, Edited Selection on "Law and Grace"
O'Donovan, Biblical Ethics
Genesis 1:24-31
Romans 1:19-27
Aquinas, Edited Selection on "Law and Grace," part 2
Northcott, Ecology and Christian Ethics
Romans 2.6-16
Joseph Butler, ‘Sermon II: On the Natural Supremacy of Conscience’ from Sermons: Fifteen Sermons Preached at the Rolls Chapel (1827)
Galatians 5: 13-26

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I would agree with Laura’s point, there is no place for emotion within Kant’s ethical theory. Duty must be a ‘law for all human wills’ and must be defined independent of inclination or feelings. At the heart of Kant’s deontology is the idea that certain actions are always right or wrong. If we try to bring any kind of feeling or emotion in, there is no way we can stick to this principle because we would always judge actions according to our own feelings, not some external idea of what is right or wrong. In terms of faith, Kant argues that while faith is not a necessary condition for achieving the good, he still holds the Christian emphasis on the will as the centre of the moral life.
OMEKA
LEARNING THROUGH DIGITAL CURATION
Jesus and the Gospels: Main Exhibits

The Galilee Boat

The Arch of Titus

The Alexamenos Graffito

Codex Sinaiticus
Graffiti in the Ancient World

Ten bronze styli of identical form found together in the ruins of what was most likely a Roman period school,

We might think of graffiti as being a modern form of art or expression, but its origins are in the ancient world. Historians have found over six thousand graffiti in Pompeii and they claim that the graffiti explains more about the culture, feelings and circumstances of Pompeians of that time, than any other sources. Likewise, the same evidence is found in Rome where about every single surface of marble or similar material has some sort of graffiti on it. Common for all of them is that the graffiti, whether it something interesting such as letters, symbols, sentences, emblems or profane words and caricatures, all are carved with a knife, nail or similar sharp instrument.

This has led historians and archaeologists to believe that carrying such objects was something very common and that graffiti was a normal way of expressing oneself. The same pattern is found today.

The Alexamenos graffito can be placed under the category of caricature as it is widely interpreted that the inscription or graffiti
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The Alexamenos Graffito carved in plaster on a wall near the Palatine Hill in Rome.

Discovery
In 1857, the Alexamenos graffito was unearthed during an excavation of the Domus Gelotiana, a house in the Imperial Palace of Emperor Caligula.

The palace rests on the Palatine, one of the montes within the limits of the old city of Rome. The Domus Gelotiana (House of Gelotius) was bought by Emperor Caligula in the third century C.E. and incorporated into the crown property. Still a boy at the time, Caligula was quite fond of horse races and purchased the house because it was the closest building on the Palatine to the circus. The Domus consists of an outer part that remains...
LESSONS LEARNED
1. Embed Blogging in Course Design
2. Simplicity and Elegance Matter
3. Communicate the Proper Writing Modes
4. Ensure Accessible Support
5. Don’t Blame the Tool